THE GORDON REVIEW

VOL. V NO. 3 FALL, 1959

Editor
CHARLES A. HUTTAR

»«

Assistant Editors
LLOYD F. DEAN
ANN D. FERGUSON
DAVID L. FRANZ
EVERETT L. FULLAM
PHILIP C. JOHNSON
ARNO W. KOLZ
THOMAS H. LEITH
ROGER R. NICOLE
H. OMAR OLNEY
CHARLES F. PFEIFFER
H. WADE SEAFORD, JR.
THOMAS GRADY SPIRES
DONALD F. TWEEDIE, JR.

»«

Subscription Rates

Single Copy	$ .75
One Year	2.00

»«

Address all correspondence to:
GORDON REVIEW
Beverly Farms, Mass.

Contents

Resolution Is Not Enough — Kermit Eby — 98

Democracy — the Religion of Dewey's Pragmatism — Cyril D. Garrett — 105

Distributive Justice — Edwin H. Palmer — 114

The Dilemmas of Christian Colleges — Bernard Ramm — 126

» • «

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

LEFEVRE — THE CHRISTIAN TEACHER
KNELLER — EXISTENTIALISM AND EDUCATION
ADLER — THE EDUCATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL
Peter Veltman 129

WHITE — RELIGION, POLITICS AND THE HIGHER LEARNING
Thomas H. Leith 132

PFEIFFER — BETWEEN THE TESTAMENTS
William L. Lane 133

ABRAMS ed. — LITERATURE AND BELIEF
Clyde S. Kilby 134

WHITING — MILTON AND THIS PENDANT WORLD
Ralph Hone 135

BRIEF NOTICES

Custance, *The Development of Personality;* Jones, *Calvary Attitudes;* Hobbs, *The Crucial Words from Calvary;* Demaray, *Loyalty to Christ;* Morgan, *An Exposition of the Whole Bible;* Kent, *An Architect Preaches.*

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT ARTICLES

Thomas H. Leith 138

The GORDON REVIEW is published quarterly by *The Gordon Review,* an organization consisting of the members listed above. Entered as second class matter at Beverly Farms, Mass. Printed in U.S.A.

This journal is not an official publication of Gordon College or Gordon Divinity School. It is an independent production by its board of editors. The school and editorial board take no responsibility for individual opinions expressed herein. It is hoped that the viewpoints presented may be provocative of further discussion in important areas of Christian thought.

RESOLUTION IS NOT ENOUGH

KERMIT EBY

Before me, as I write, are two piles of sources. One contains resolutions concerning ethical practices, or lack thereof, of the AFL-CIO and many of its great member unions, such as Steel, Auto Workers, and Machinists. In the other pile is the record of the AFL-CIO's attempts to implement its resolutions.

The resolutions read much the same, as if they had been drawn up by the same committee or the same lawyer. They decry corruption and point out the long historical criticisms of the movement toward corruption in business and government. They point with pride to the purge of communism in 1949, affirm their faith in democracy, and ask, by inference, a continued faith in their integrity.

There is an undertone of hurt pride and a bit of arrogance in more than one of the resolutions, "for after all," they claim "*we* are the defenders of the weak, the protectors of democracy, the enemies of reaction"!

The records of action on resolution are forthright, particularly in AFL-CIO. The guilty leaders and unions are confronted with their guilt and threatened with expulsion. Believe me, it takes great moral courage to expel ten to twelve per cent of an organization's dues-paying membership, such as the Teamsters represent.

There, too, is an evidence of good faith on the part of the AFL-CIO to cooperate with the McClellan Committee. All of this is good, but not good enough. Not even Walter Reuther's watchdog committee of prominent citizens is good enough.

Both resolutions and watchdog committees begin with the wrong assumptions. Underlying their action is a declaration that the guilty should be punished. Underlying mine is the affirmation that the unions must ask why there are the guilty in the first place. For a long time I have had a continuing argument with a labor publicist who says I have no right to demand a higher morality of labor leaders than I do of any other members of the American economic community. And I always reply to him: "Indeed, I do." Just as I demand a higher morality of churchmen who profess dedication to more than secular values.

So, if I could influence the labor movement, there would be less resolving and more personal and institutional introspection. It has long been my thesis that the tragedy of the labor movement has been its corruption by the mores of the world it once challenged. The churches, also, come under this judgment. The examples are many and obvious in union practices:

(1) Its drive toward salaries of union officers comparable to those of management.

(2) Its ostentatious accommodations, e.g. in Washington and other cities where union headquarters are located.

(3) The quality of the accommodations demanded by its representatives at conventions and meetings: hotels on the boardwalk in Atlantic City.

(4) The Miami habit — going South for winter convention vacations.

(5) Expense accounts and the use of money as a tool to influence policy.

(6) The development of a "pork chopper" mentality — the distance between those who live on dues and those who pay them.

(7) A tendency to look at the union as *my* union; the members as *my* members; or the equating of the union with business.

More than once I have pointed out that the Beck who fell so far was once the darling of the business community, and more than once I have been told by members of the business community of Detroit: "You can do business with Hoffa; he doesn't run off at the mouth and want to reform the world"!

But I don't mean to belabor the above observations. They have been illustrated in other articles of mine. (See the *Christian Century,* July 3, 1957). Just one final illustration: there is much concern in the labor movement because of the discrepancy in McDonald's $50,000 per year and the $100,000 or $150,000 of a U. S. Steel executive. It would be more relevant if the concern were expressed for the spread between the $50,000 of McDonald and the $5,000 of the dues-payers who provide it. It is scarcely honest, it seems to me, for the movement to use the standards of the business community as its models for rewarding its officers.

I would only develop the argument that I would feel more hopeful if a bit more *mea culpa* were in the protest of those who write labor's resolutions, a bit more willingness to admit a common guilt. But perhaps this is too much to expect from individuals who continue to feel themselves an exploited minority — which they may have been in the thirties, but today in the eyes of the American public most certainly no longer are.

The main trouble of so many labor leaders I have known is their lack of a sense of humor. They take themselves so seriously. Probably because in the movement they came to power by much speaking, and they have become used to their own voices. They are poor conversationalists; in other words, they are poor listeners. Furthermore, next to the ministry, there is no other world in which it is so easy to play God. Finally, as in all tight power structures, there is no one to say "Nuts"

to officer bombast, not even the court fool who in times past could both regale and instruct the king. Since there is little or no room for self-criticism and for all practical purposes no historical criticism in the movement, no letters to the editor or talk back to officers, little is offered. Of course, the movement responds to criticism, but almost invariably the criticism is external to it. Thus it was in the case of corruption. Those who suggested that all was not well in the house of labor were looked upon as disloyal.

You see, the labor movement as a minority movement grew and prospered with its highest value expressed in loyalty for those next to you and particularly above. In the power structure loyalty is an important virtue in times of crisis, in war time or strike, but it is a virtue which, unless outgrown, muzzles criticism. The team is important, but the truth as men see it is more so.

This emphasis on loyalty to the man above in this power hierarchy is one against which I rebelled early and long as a labor bureaucrat. It always seemed to me that I had a higher responsibility than loyalty to a man, particularly if I did not respect him. Loyalty to me is something that can be given, but never commanded.

Because of this stress on loyalty, and the supersensitivity of the leaders, there can be no equal exchange between men, and little honest criticism. In order to make possible honest evaluation, I would begin with academic freedom in the movement itself. Now there is much emphasis on education in the labor movemnts. Like Protestants, unions boast of numbers of institutes and numbers in attendance. But too often, these institutes are controlled and staffed by men who are conscious of the line and willing to follow it.

For example, the men who determine the top policy of the Auto Workers stressed three years ago the annual wage which was ratified by the convention. Then the educators went to work to indoctrinate the rank and file, and, may I add, succeeded. But that is not education, it's indoctrination. Education from my point of view means the willingness to begin with the open end instead of a fixed agenda. It assumes that educators make available to the workers all of the facts, even those contrary to the line. Expressing it another way, those who have the information must be willing to make it available, even though it may ultimately be used to upset the status quo.

This willingness must rest on the leaders' part in the labor movement as seen in their constant affirmation and dedication to their fellow men. Have they not, more than once, resolved that labor and the people who make it up are not commodities, but real flesh and blood persons? Realizing this constant affirmation I have a tendency to be very disturbed

when a labor leader speaks about "my" union or even of the "rank and file". Or for that matter a bishop who cannot resist speaking of the ministers under him as "my" team disturbs my sense of individual dignity. After all, it should at least be "our" union and "our" church!

The real heart of my argument rests on the conviction that there can be no real education in a voluntary organization such as labor until there is a frank appraisal of power and power relationships in the immediate area where power operates and impinges. Only the man who wears the shoe knows where it pinches. It just doesn't make sense to study power relationships in the other man's back yard while utterly ignoring one's own. (By the way, here at the University of Chicago there are excellent studies of power relationships in labor, management, political party and government, but none that I know of in the University itself).

Now if the labor movement had a sense of humor or were self-critical, it might ask why it builds its political strategy on a two-party system and then takes advantage of the factions within a single party and at the same time is so everlastingly afraid of factions or parties in its own ranks. In fact, many labor spokesmen are as humorless as the most concerned communists who insist that it is freedom for the slate to be determined by the elite and voted for or against by the members. Or the many can always debate policy after the policy is determined by the few.

Just listen to the leaders of the Steel Workers in Chicago (the same men who speak so eloquently on democracy) as they denounce the followers of Don Rarick, who had the temerity to challenge incumbent leadership and organize a Dues (increase) Protest Committee and poll almost a third of the Steel Worker vote in a recent election. Let's listen to Joseph Germano, regional director, speak: "The Dues Protest Committee is a group of dissidents which numbers amongst its membership nearly all the Communists and Trotskyites that have been well known to the union." Al Whitehouse, another district director, in the same vein said: "Our greatest enemies are the company stooges within our ranks." Charles Smith of the same rank spoke of "dirty rotten traitors who are trying to destroy our union from within." Still another, James Robb: "We [the union] got all we can expect from the companies, so now let's start fighting the international executive board . . . Those people who are fighting us are going to be exposed, brought to trial and thrown out of the union."

Now, one has to be more than a bit stuffy to take oneself so seriously as to simply imply that every third Steel Worker is a divisionist, or a stooge, or a traitor!

Practically, the problem is the concept of indispensability which

is so prevalent in the movement. Self-perpetuation is the aim instead of preparation of men to succeed to power, men capable of taking over responsibility. In fact, it seems to me that the chief problem of the AFL-CIO is its rigidity due to the middle-age of its leaders, the young radicals of the thirties. They have their memories of business cycles, depressions, and soup lines. Their tactics appropriately hark back to those bleak days, but they are dealing with a younger generation who has not lived through depression and sit-down strikes and has neither the memories nor the philosophy.

Consequently unions today are great bodies, powerful organizations with no souls. Universally the plaint is: members do not come to the meetings. Really, why should they? The power structures are rigged, and there is no ideology unless it is an emphasis on more — more pay and more security. Pay and security are important incentives, I'm sure, but not incentives enough to capture a man's imagination.

To counteract this, I would resolve above all, to initiate all policy from below, from cell and discussion group, and to bring into these discussions every conflicting view and then seek synthesis. Frankly, I do not believe union democracy is possible unless men feel free to introduce controversy. There is utterly *no hope,* if the incumbent power structure attacks opposition as disloyal. Once ideological differences are tolerated, groups will spring up around them. Thus, the caucus is born. If free, the caucus may develop into a faction, the faction into a party. When this is accomplished the dialectic is present out of which progress comes. As it stands, conformity kills wherever the power structure demands.

In essence, I am saying that the only men who can be trusted with power are those who are willing to give it up. And the only organizations which can be trusted are those which have built in them, either by precedent or constitutional provision, the machinery for the orderly transfer of power.

Recognizing, then, men's unwillingness to give up power, and organizational tendencies to self-perpetuation, I would invite the labor movement in this day of resolving to amend its constitutions, to place limitations on the length of officers' tenure, to incorporate in the election provisions the necessity for contested elections, to make possible and easy the selection of candidates by petition, and not allow employees of the unions to be convention delegates, but permit only the so-called "rank and file," the members, to represent themselves. Finally, so that sinecures were not so overwhelming, I would also place limitations on salaries and emoluments. As a yardstick I would attempt to relate the salaries of officers to those who pay dues. However, having argued for constitutional, explicit control, may I say that I wish the gyroscopes were

built-in and constitutional restriction unnecessary. Maybe this is the idealist in me.

When I was in the labor movement, I had more than one *supposedly* communist contact. We had little in common, much for the same reason that I have little in common with all power-seekers. My Marxist colleagues were forever extolling the masses, and forever, from my point of view, despising the individuals who comprise the mass. (Once the secretary of a more highly paid and supposedly communist colleague came to me to borrow money. When I asked her why she didn't borrow from her boss, she replied that she wouldn't dare to.) To me it is impossible for one to love the masses and deny the parts, just as it is impossible to claim identity with the workers and yet live completely separate from them. In other words, I think that man is only redeemed when he shares his brothers' suffering.

As I have suggested, resolutions are not enough. To me the important question is: Mr. President, what do you really think of the rank and file, the dues-payers who man the assembly lines? Are they statistics, names on cards, or men with the same dignity as yourself and the same possibility of decision? If they are not decimal points or numbers, why are you so contemptuous of them, so anxious to live at another income level and be soothed by piped-in music and conditioned air?

Perhaps, if all of us thought more of "power with" and less of "power over," we would be less inclined to speak of "my" union, or of the Steel Workers as the hierarchy at 1500 Commonwealth. The union is not merely its officers. This being so, there is no real hope for reform beyond resolution until the union structure is permeated with new men and a new philosophy.

Where to begin, you ask. In the first place there must be a restoration of the fraternity on which the labor movement was built. Today, its distances between officers and rank and file disturb me almost as much as the corruption. Dave Beck's greatest sin was not pilfering; it was arrogance, contempt for those from whence he sprang. As I have said, the efforts to purge the corrupt have been top level efforts. It is Meany and Reuther and their ethical practices committee waging a war on Beck and Hoffa. So far there has been little or no sustained effort to involve the rank and file in the crusade. And more than once, I have heard top leaders express their doubt about rank and file willingness to take a moral position: "We," the top brass imply, "are a few pure St. Georges fighting corruption below us and all around us." When unions grow so large, as the Steel Workers, Auto Workers, and others have, when they have a million or more members and equally great resources, it is hard for the "decision-makers" to keep contact with those whose decisions

they control. The officers are part of a bureaucracy in the same manner as the officers of a giant corporation are a part of a power structure. In the Auto Workers the leadership is more enlightened, but the distance is as great and the apathy as intense. Probably, the guiding geniuses of the Auto Workers are too clear in regard to what they want to do for the rank and file and too reluctant to ask what the workers want done.

I have already referred to the attacks of the Steel Workers union officials on the members who used their franchise to protest dues increase. To me the protest was indicative of the discontent of many a union member who felt himself the victim of a powerful and impersonal machine. Unable to respond positively, they seized on opportunities to express their protest and to vote against their manipulators.

Fundamentally, then, I conclude with the thesis that the unions are failing at the point of the strongest claim for their existence, viz., respect for human dignity. To restore this, unions in this age need broader goals than merely good jobs and bread-and-butter demands. To begin I would invite all unions to resolve to let the power of decision return to the people. Wherever and whenever possible, human values in the industrial processes should be put first. This is imperative in an age of automation and leisure. Management in this area is ahead of labor. Here at the university, there is an emphasis on the liberal arts for business executives and an effort to give dignity to a man as man. This unions must learn to do. Men do not like to believe their function is machine-life, nor the check-off for dues their only significance in the union.

Recently during a discussion of inflation a high ranking officer of the Steel Workers asked my opinion of their policies. I replied: "They are too inbred." "The time has come," I continued, "when the productivity increases you talk about must be reflected in reduced prices to consumers. The merry-go-round of price and wage increases must stop." Since then, I have thought a great deal about my reply. It has broader ramifications than I realized. Union members must be brought into involvement of public issues. The time has passed when great organizations dare put the private welfare of themselves and members first. Labor must, if it would go forward, go forward with the community and not against it. The day is past when labor can find its defense as a persecuted minority.

Today, there are many resolutions and much soul-searching in the labor movement. If it were possible, I would revise the order of priority and begin with soul-searching, invite a sense of humor, the tolerance of historical criticism, the reevaluation of the loyalty concept, the free flow of information, the encouragement of dissent, the self-limitation of power, and the increase of union and public responsibility.

DEMOCRACY — THE RELIGION OF DEWEY'S PRAGMATISM

CYRIL D. GARRETT

Introduction

John Dewey was born in 1859. During his ninety-three years he exerted an impact upon American education hardly equaled by any other individual. On his ninetieth birthday he was given $90,000 — $1,000 for each year of his life — to use in benevolent causes. At this near mid-century mark, and at the time of his birth centennial, it seems reasonable that Americans should attempt some appraisals of Dewey's impact on American life, particularly American education.

This article traces the thinking of pragmatists in arriving at their view of personality and human nature. It also shows the relationship between this point of view of man and "democracy" as defined by pragmatists. In conclusion this article seeks to show how the "democratic process" becomes the religious faith of pragmatism. The writer believes there are a number of just criticisms that may be offered against this pragmatic position, and he offers several.

Dewey was born in Vermont and received his undergraduate work at the University of Vermont. He earned his Ph.D. at Johns Hopkins University in 1884. At Johns Hopkins he came under the teachings of George Sylvester Morris, an idealist in philosophical orientation. After graduation Dewey went, as an instructor, with Morris to the University of Michigan when Morris accepted a professorship there. Although Dewey seems to have shared the idealistic leanings of his teacher-friend, he gradually began to break away by developing a more empirical idealism. Butler[1] traces the progress of the change-over from idealism as indicated by Morton White in his study of *The Origins of Dewey's Instrumentalism.*[2] The change-over seems to have been quite definite by 1892. This change-over from idealism meant that Dewey had forsaken the theistic position and had rejected the notion of a Universal Self. He felt the idea of a Universal Self was superfluous and that the selfhood of the individual could be adequately explained in behaviorism. He forsook the concept of the individual self as a spiritual ego or soul. The selfhood of the individual was explained by his participation in the physical-social phenomena that surrounded him. Intelligence became a social function developed in interaction with the physical-social environment and not a metaphysical substratum of the Universal Mind. By

1. J. Donald Butler, *Four Philosophies and Their Practices in Education and Religion* (New York, 1957), p. 441.
2. New York, 1948. See pp. 106, 47, 58, 102-103.

the time Dewey went to the University of Chicago in 1894, he seems to have laid the basic groundwork for the development of his type of pragmatism.

All of these changes were significant and deserve fuller explanation, for the philosophy of pragmatism was to have its fullest development in relation to education. Dewey's pragmatism is basically a system of naturalism. Childs comments that Dewey's naturalism is as primary as his empiricism,[3] and to grasp the full significance of his educational ideas one must grasp the naturalistic point of view which pervades them.

Evolution in Pragmatism

The theory of evolution is basic in Dewey's pragmatism. According to Childs,[4] it has at least a three-fold meaning 1. It provides the theoretical structure for a universe with the "lid off," where everything is "ever-becoming" and undetermined. Instead of a system of static, fixed relationships, there is change, novelty, and precariousness. 2. It brings man and all his cultural achievements within the natural process of development. Man is continuous with nature, not separate from it. 3. It permits a way of explaining the development of certain characteristics peculiar to man, i.e. mind, intelligence, selfhood, language, development of tools, without resorting to mind-body dualisms or matter-spirit dualisms.

The development of those traits referred to as "human" are explained as part of the natural evolutionary process. In this naturalistic approach to understanding man, great emphasis is put on the "principle of continuity." This principal of continuity excludes the need for any outside force to cause changes to occur and includes the development of mind within the biological order. Thus the pragmatism of Dewey developed an evolutionary concept of mind grounded in the principle that there is "continuity" in the human, the biological, and the physical orders of existence.

To develop such a concept of mind Dewey recognized three levels of behavior or interaction. In these levels of interaction novel traits appear until nature, in man, demonstrates the intellectual character when mind develops.

At the physical level a thing may be related to other things yet be

3. John L. Childs, *American Pragmatism and Education* (New York, 1956), pp. 51-52.
4. pp. 53-55. The writer has made much use of Childs' writings in this paper, because he quotes and interprets Dewey's pragmatism most directly. Childs seems to be emerging, since Kilpatrick and Bode, as the prominent expositor of Dewey's pragmatism. Words and phrases in quotation marks are from this source unless otherwise noted.

independent and maintain its own identity. It is the differentiation of natures of things that arouses action between things. Different natures cause "fields of tension" to develop when individualized things come into contact with each other. Thus, iron and water being different interact to cause rust when they come into contact. The cause of the activity lies within the field of interaction of natural events. A disturbed equilibrium follows, resulting in something new — the rust.

At the psycho-physical level there is a process of preferential response because of certain affinities that are marked by interests. At the physical level iron has no interest to maintain its identity as such, but living things seek to preserve their individuality. An amoeba will withdraw from certain chemicals. A hydra will close to certain objects. These evidences of discrimination are the essence of sensitivity. Adjustment to maintain the optimum situations of life requires direction and discrimination, so effort is made to achieve a satisfying relationship with the environment. Living things are "biased" and seek to discriminate in favor of the life-sustaining conditions. This is the fountain-head out of which conscious, life-directing behavior is born.

At the psychical level of existence "reflective, creative, responsible, and self-conscious mind" emerges. Living beings strive for existence in groups. Gestures, grunts, growls, etc. may become understood symbols if they take on meaning and give direction or coordination to other people. A group of men may notice they can exert more effort if they all grunt and push at the same time. The grunt becomes a socially significant symbol to coordinate action. When vocalizations and gestures carry sufficient meaning that others can understand how they are to act or feel, communication has been achieved. When the socially significant symbol permits one to internalize the behavior of other things or people, intelligence has begun to function.

Development of Selfhood

Intelligence is a social process that demonstrates itself in one's ability to interact meaningfully with others. This ability depends upon communication and significant social symbols. Through understanding of the significant symbols and internalizing others' feelings about them, the selfhood of the individual emerges. George Mead, outstanding social psychologist who contributed much to Dewey's understanding of the development of the self, outlines at least three levels of role-taking through which the selfhood emerges. 1. The child makes automatic *imitations* of those around him. He smiles, cries, frowns. Through these actions he shows that he is beginning to move from random, uncoordinated behavior to organized social action. 2. The *play* stage in role taking is

evidenced when a child begins to act the part of others. He may play father, mother, fire chief or farmer. In taking these roles he develops a concept of himself as these other people see him. He acquires the cultural interpretation of these social relationships. Thus, his culture teaches him the roles he may play and how he must play them. 3. At the *game* stage a person learns to take different roles as a member of a team may play different positions for the good of the team. Out of this stage one learns to accept and play the organized roles expected of him in society. He not only learns the overt behavior, but he learns the covert attitudes and feelings that are to accompany his behavior. In relation to the feelings and expectations of others about himself, one develops a concept of "self" or "selfhood."

When an individual accepts the ideals, principles, and beliefs of his culture and internalizes them as his own personal standards they become a "generalized other" by which he organizes and brings consistency into his behavior. Thus, the young person develops a mind, a self, and becomes an integrated member of his society. The impact of the social environment in developing the selfhood and mind are so important that the pragmatist refers to the child as a "social-vocal phenomenon."

The whole process of role-taking and development of selfhood is dependent upon the socially significant symbols, communication, particularly language. It is through language that one becomes aware of the meanings of his cultural acts. Language changes objects into meanings. Things are identified and classified on the bases of the consequences they produce. Dewey held that the most convincing evidence that animals do not think is that they develop no tools. Since the development of mind and selfhood are dependent upon the process of transmission and reconstruction of the social heritage, the pragmatist places a great emphasis on transmitting and refining the cultural heritage. But in the main the process of cultural transmission is more important to him than the products. As Dewey says:

> Ours is the responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying, and expanding the cultural heritage of values we have received that those who come after us may receive it more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared than we received it. Here are all elements of a religious faith that should not be confined to a sect, class, or race. Such a faith has always been implicitly the faith of mankind. It remains to make it explicit and militant.[5]

Religion in Pragmatism

Thus, in such naturalism, Dewey sees "all the elements of a religious faith." How does he make this "implicit" faith "explicit"? by relating it to "Democracy," spelled with a capital *D*. In Dewey's opinion,

5. John Dewey, *A Common Faith* (New Haven, 1934), p. 87.

Democracy and education are inherently related. Democracy represents the deliberate effort to organize society in such a way that its social practices and solution of problems will help all elements of society to grow. In the educational thought of Dewey, democracy is as fundamental as the concept of experimental science. According to Childs, the program of education he envisioned for the nurture of the young would "be grounded in both the scientific way of thought and the democratic way of life." [6]

In such a program, morals or ethics are not a separate aspect of life based on transcendental standards, they are embedded in the method of scientific inquiry. Under the "right kind of educational program, utilizing the scientific method, the young could learn to make moral decisions in an empirical manner." Thus the traditional moral aspects of education are superfluous since the problem-solving approach to education would apply equally well to values as to facts. This meant a naturalization of morals, defining the "good" and the "right" on naturalistic, empirical bases.

> This process leads to the conclusion that
>
> the right is that which is in harmony with personal and social good. The good is that which makes for all-around growth. We grow as we learn. We learn as we grow. Education is moral — good and right — when it provides the kind of experiencing which leads to the formulation of the habits, the interests, and the intellectual and emotional dispositions which make for continuous growth. But the source of our conceptions and standards of the good and right lies within — not outside — this process of living, learning, and growing. Living requires no ends or standards other than those which its own ongoing movements provides. In fine, experience rests on its own moral foundations, and the good is that reconstruction of the process of living which makes for richer experience.[7]

Thus, neither education nor life, in general, has any end outside itself. They are subordinate only to more growth, more reconstruction of experience. The individual becomes the center of experience and emphasis on individual growth becomes identified with the concept of the worth of the individual — the basic concept of democracy. Written large, in its societal form, this means that pragmatism is committed to the "faith that ordinary men and women, by the responsible evaluation of the consequences of their own activities, can develop from within the matrix of their experiences all the necessary regulative standards, laws, and institutions."[8] The "responsible evaluation of the consequences of their own activities" is the heart of Dewey's democratic process. It is the religion of democracy. It produces standards, laws, institutions that are adequate for man's needs.

Morality is placed on an empirical basis and morals are subjected to

6. Childs, pp. 105-106.
7. Childs, p. 111.
8. Childs, p. 114.

the test of group experience. There can be no authoritarianism in ethics. The idea of a spiritual nature is rejected. The group process by which acts are evaluated in terms of their consequence is "DEMOCRACY," the social process of the "scientific method."

"Human nature" has social dimensions as well as biological dimensions. Since it is the social context in which the questions of values arise, it is in the social context that Dewey justifies his claims for democracy as *the* "way of life." This is his way of making it "militant." The democratic criterion becomes the measure of any kind of social life. According to pragmatic theory, the human is as dependent upon the social order as he is upon the biological order. Perpetuation of the race and transmission of culture require interdependence — the human being is an individual because of and in relation with others. Social relations are essential. Out of these social relations grow duties, rights, and responsibilities that are inherent in these social relations. From this "matrix of social relations" with its rights and duties have come public regulation and institutions.

> The legislator, judge, assessor, sheriff does not exercise authority as his private possession, but as the representative of relations in which many share. He is an organ of the community of interests and purposes. In principle, therefore, Right expresses the way in which the Good of a number of persons held together by intrinsic ties, becomes efficacious in the regulation of the members of a community.[9]

The seat of authority for moral action lies within the community. If the community defines something as "right" and "good," one should accept it as such even though he personally disagrees. The duties to the group justify this obligation.

> This type of moral authority denotes a system of self-government in which activities are carried on under authority which the people have formed and sanctioned and which they voluntarily obey. Insofar as any society provides in its social and legal arrangements for the functioning of this kind of authority, it will be marked by characteristics which we have come to recognize and cherish as democratic.[10]

A society organized on the principle of authority based on voluntary consent of its members will believe in equality, a sharing of interests, and the dignity and worth of the individual.

Pragmatism based upon evolution breaks with the concept of supernatural origin. It has no need of a "Soul," for the mind will develop and the self will blossom as a result of "social interaction." There are no needs for absolutes in ethics, for morals are not separate from other areas of problems. There is no faith in predetermined ends, for life at its best is a reconstruction and reorganization of experience. There are no outside goals, for education, as growth, is subject to nothing but more growth.

9. John Dewey and James Tufts, *Ethics,* rev. ed. (New York, 1932), p. 249.
10. Childs, pp. 130-131.

Dewey believed man's religious tendencies would adapt themselves to whatever new knowledge "reflective inquiry" revealed. God not only becomes finite — as James believed Him to be — He becomes obsolete and superfluous. Since religion as implied in revelation or transcendental experience is not in harmony with "cooperative inquiry" it is invalid. Instead, faith in intelligence has a religious quality, shared experience has a "fellowship" or "brotherhood" quality and the social group is capable of developing from within its experience the regulative experiences and principles necessary, thus vetoing supernatural ethics. Since nature demonstrates its intelligence in man, and man becomes intelligent through social interaction, the "social process" becomes the shrine where everyone must worship. The camel that slipped his nose under the tent in the guise of a "method of inquiry" has now entered all the way, pushing out occupants, equipment and blatantly declares that he is not only "method of inquiry" but metaphysics and ethics as well. Americans are beginning to recognize that this "monster" has gotten fat on the scraps of supernatural religion they have fed him piece by piece in order to use his "method of inquiry."

With the shift of authority from supernatural revelation to publicly observed consequences, we have come to like our license and would hardly have courage to defeat it by our dictum, "It has not worked, therefore it is not true!" By identifying philosophy with education the pragmatist has sold the American public a "bill of goods." He did not inform the buyer that his "method of inquiry," if followed to its logical consequences, would reduce religion to a group of social relationships in which the consequences of acts were publicly evaluated by reflective inquiry. Dewey may have brought democracy into education, but if so, it was at the expense of Deity.

Some Objections

One may raise some serious questions about a process that equates the explanation of a thing with the essence of the thing itself. Dewey and other pragmatists have done just that in defining the self as a "social-vocal phenomenon." There is no doubt much value in the explanation of how one's concept of his selfhood develops, but to explain this process does not define its essence. To show how a person learns to define his relationships, rights, and responsibilities to others does not explain the "isness" of the person. Definition by operation cannot be substituted or equated with definition by ontology.

Pragmatism is woefully weak on its ontological position, and this is one of the stirring problems that has continually challenged the mind of man. The human mind has an insatiable desire to push matters to their logical conclusions, their ultimates, their absolutes, to some sort of certainty

that gives significance to life. It is hardly satisfied with anything lacking this certainty. Pragmatism's concept of the self lacks it. When the pragmatist, through his naturalistic-experimental method has dissected the human personality into all its physical, biological, social elements and demonstrated how they interact to form the self, a "social-vocal phenomenon," the self, so defined, rebels. It rebels to say, "Is this really all I am? Somehow, you have found it necessary to imply all the qualities and attributes of 'spirit' without admitting its existence and presence. The test of your own philosophy — essence being proved by consequences — demands that I am more than you have labelled me to be." This demand of man's spiritual nature to be recognized seems to be well summarized by Michael Demiashkevich:

> . . . Religion in reality serves what seems to be an inherent and irradicable [sic] need of man for the ultimate certainty. Neither science nor philosophy satisfies this need. It is precisely after he has solved satisfactorily the more poignant problems and mysteries arising out of the relationship between man and his material environment that man is more than ever pervaded with the wondrous longing to know the ultimate truth and the ultimate Being, and to find in such knowledge repose and guidance.
>
> . . . Science cannot, therefore, nor can anything else, replace the solace of religion.
>
> . . . Doubtless religion will survive the agnostic instrumentalism of Dewey, as it has survived many schools of philosophic thought which sought to rule it out as a vital force, or to sneer it out of existence, for the simple reason that religion proposes to give man something that he needs most even when he has obtained all other things. That is, to repeat it, the ultimate certainty which neither science nor philosophy can supply.[11]

Dewey's concept of democracy — the societal use of the experimental method and the evaluation of consequences of acts in relation to the individual and group welfare — assumes a willingness on the part of people to consider the welfare of others above one's own when they come in conflict. This assumption has the weight of human history against it. The testimony of any school day as confirmed by school teachers would hardly substantiate it. Man is self-centered, not other-centered. Before one will consider the welfare of others above his own, he must be faced with an "ought," not an "if you please," situation. What is the pragmatist's concept of alcoholism as evaluated in the light of the consequences of the dead? How many people are refusing government subsidies because they are evaluating the consequences of their subsidies on the national welfare in terms of increased taxes, inflation, and cost of living increases? Has man ever deferred war because he evaluated its consequences in terms of group welfare? Has human society abstained from sinful practices on this kind of principle?

The basic assumption of Dewey's Democracy is the concept of the "worth of the individual," a worth based upon the value of man because of rights, privileges, and responsibilities growing from societal and bio-

11. Michael Demiashkevich, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* (New York, 1935), pp. 114-115.

logical interdependence. Such a position assumes that each individual has "intrinsic" value because of his potential to develop a "human nature." Certainly one would agree that the concept of the worth of the individual is basic in democratic living, but one may strongly disagree with pragmatists on the presuppositions underlying this doctrine. Consider, for instance, the view of Canon Theodore O. Wedel:

> To return now to the problem with which we began. The dogma of the sacredness of the personality or of the integrity of the individual is evidently not quite as simple as it seems. A purely secular world-view will not preserve it. Bound human existence by human birth and death, and man as man will go handed over to the ruthless warfare of power. Illusion may disguise the brutal fact for a time, but eventually man's worth becomes cheap and expendable. The collective state turns into a substitute deity. Man as a person has no rights. He lives by grace — the grace of human dictatorship which is its own arbitrary law. The dogma of the sacredness of personality is safe only in a social ordering in which a God is left upon His throne and in which secular rule is itself under a higher law . . . .
>
> The dogma of individual rights, we must therefore conclude, is not a truth standing on its own. It is a derivative dogma, and depends upon divine, not secular sanctions. It does not derive from a doctrine of the inherent goodness of human nature, or a sacredness of personality which man has earned. It derives, rather, from the doctrines of the sinfulness of human nature and the universal judgment and grace of a righteous God . . . . No secularist humanism will preserve it for long. The preservation of freedom in human society depends not upon the dogma of the sacredness of man, but upon man's acknowledging of himself to be the opposite of sacred and calling himself a sinner. The foundation of Christian democracy is the doctrine of original sin. Man is ultimately sacred only to God, and to those of his fellows who see him through the eyes of the mercy and the grace of God. When man assumes worth and sacredness as an inherent right, he commits the sin of pride. A secular democracy based on human pride will meet with disaster.[12]

Pragmatism's Democracy, which floats about in space, blown by whatever whims of evaluations of consequences may be current, seems doomed to failure. This failure is caused by the nature of those charged with the responsibility of evaluating the consequences of their deeds by reflective thinking. Human nature is so self-centered that it seeks its own benefit under guise of the benefit of the group unless, under the providence of God, it is recreated by the Spirit of God to seek His glory. Democracy, apart from the underpinnings of Christianity — the sovereignty of God and the worth of the individual based upon the value God placed on human personality in redemption — will strangle itself with the cloak of selfishness. Some reflective thought by which the pragmatist evaluated the consequences of human experience in history should be adequate data for him to cry out — "It has not worked, consequently it is not true." Then we could return American education to democracy spelled with a little *d* and could return American education to Deity spelled with a capital *D*.

12. William Scarlet ed., *The Christian Demand for Social Justice* (New York, 1949), pp. 14, 15, 16.

DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

EDWIN H. PALMER

Historically the public schools in the United States are young. From the first permanent settlement in Jamestown, Virginia, in 1607 to the second quarter of the nineteenth century — in other words, for the first two centuries of America's history — education was non-public, being conducted chiefly by church schools. In the third century of the history of our nation public schools arose, under the stimulus of Horace Mann. These were tax-supported and open to all. They were not meant to replace the private schools, but to provide education for those not reached by the private schools. Gradually the public schools grew in number so that by the turn of the century the predominant school system had turned from the private to public one.

Today we are witnessing a small but significant reversal of this process. For example, in the school year 1943-44 every tenth child from kindergarten through the eighth grade was in a non-public school. Six years later it was every eighth child. And in 1955-56 every seventh child in these grades was in a private[1] school. Likewise in the secondary schools the ratio of private school to public school pupils has increased. Whereas in 1943-44 one out of every 14 children was in a private school, in 1955-56 the ratio had risen to one out of nine. The percentage of children in the elementary and secondary private schools was 13 per cent in 1956. Because of the increasing secularization of the public schools and higher standards of living, this proportion will continue to increase significantly over the years.

From the very inception of the public schools a problem arose concerning the financial support of the schools: namely, should the supporters of the private schools be required to pay for the public schools? This problem has been solved satisfactorily in the minds of most Americans today, but there is a strong and vocal minority who are convinced that the solution is undemocratic, un-American, and unfair. Because of the rapid rise of the private school, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, there is and will continue to be an increased demand for a re-evaluation of the support of the public schools by the totality of the public. It is this subject with which we are concerned in this present article.

I. Education, the Responsibility of the Parent

It is important first of all to be aware of the inherent right of parents to educate their children. This right is biblical, natural, and American.

1. Throughout this article I use the term *private* in the sense of *non-public,* thus including the parochial schools in this term.

It is to the parents, and not to the state, that the biblical injunctions come to "train up a child in the way he should go" (Prov. 22:7). This confirms what nature teaches, since the child is an offspring of the parents.

Some Americans have not always seen this fundamental truth and have at times attempted to legislate private schools out of existence (particularly Roman Catholic and foreign-language schools). The Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly and vigorously struck down all such efforts. A notable instance occurred in 1925, when the Supreme Court declared an Oregon statute unconstitutional that prohibited parents from sending their children to Roman Catholic parochial schools. The reason given was that "the fundamental theory of liberty . . . excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." [2]

In 1944 the Supreme Court reiterated its position in denying a state the right to prohibit a child of Jehovah Witnesses from selling religious literature. Referring to the Oregon decision it stated: "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." [3]

Thus the Bible, nature, and the Supreme Court place the right and duty of the nurture of the child in the hands of the parents. When that God-given principle is not jealously guarded, then there arises the danger that the state will enter into a sphere of sovereignty that does not belong to it. If that occurs, a loss of freedom may result. This has been the case with the Chinese communes, where the government says that since the responsibility of education rests with the state and not with the parents, it is free to take the children from their parents. In America, however, the Supreme Court has firmly recognized the right of the private schools. They are not to be grudgingly tolerated as an unwanted rival of the public schools, but for the above enumerated reasons have their full right to existence. Therefore, at least 13 per cent of our children are in these private schools, where their instruction, credits, and diplomas are recognized as the equivalent of those in the public schools.

II. The Secularism of the Public Schools

It is necessary to make one more observation before we state our main thesis: Rightly or wrongly, many parents believe that it is God's

2. Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925).
3. Prince v. Massachusetts (1944).

will for them to send their children to a private school and that it is wrong to send them to the public schools. They believe that the education in the public schools is secularistic, i.e., that it is viewed as being self-sufficient and unrelated to God. These parents recognize that a school that ministers to the educational needs of children of so many beliefs has a difficult if not impossible task in maintaining peace and not offending the religious sentiments of these children. Nevertheless, whether the reasons are good or evil, they feel that the facts are that the teaching in the public schools is unrelated to God. They note that especially in the last twenty-five years the Supreme Court has passed down decision after decision which has tended to remove most of the vestiges of religion from the public schools. Since the teaching is without any reference to God — since it is "less God" — they term it "God-less."

These parents who believe that it is God's will for them to give their children a God-centered education have seen the attempts to integrate religion in the public schools and they are not satisfied. They are not impressed with the Released Time program permitted by the Supreme Court in the Zorach case.[4] For they consider this not an *integration* of religion in the schools, but a glorified Sunday School or catechetical hour artificially superimposed on a secularistic twenty-five-hour school week. Neither are these parents satisfied with the attempt to teach the "common core" or lowest common denominator of the great faiths. They agree with James Nichols, professor of the Federated Theological Faculty of the University of Chicago, that "there is no common core." "If this were the case, over what have Judaism and Christianity agonized for ages?"[5] Neither is it a solution in the minds of some of these private school parents to teach *about* religion and the great faiths. Some of them, to be concrete, believe that Jesus Christ is the eternal God, the focal point of all history, and the only Savior of men, and that the Bible is the infallible Word of God that gives guiding principles for all of life, even subjects taught in a day school. Therefore, their consciences do not allow them to have their children taught *about* Jesus and Mohammed, as you might teach them *about* the Democratic and Republican parties. But they believe their children should be taught *that* Jesus is the only God and *that* the Bible is the only infallible rule for our life, and that these facts should be thoroughly integrated into the school curriculum.

These parents see an inescapable dilemma. On the one hand, if the

4. Zorach v. Clauson (1952). The McCollum case (1948) held invalid a released time arrangement for religious instruction on school premises. But the Zorach case upheld the arrangement if the instruction were given off the school premises.
5. J. H. Nichols, "Religion and Education in a Free Society," in *Religion in America,* ed. John Cogley (Meridian, N. Y., 1958), pp. 157-158.

authorities integrate religion with education, then they are bound to offend someone. Certainly the unbeliever will not like it. In addition, if Calvinism is the integrating religion, the Lutheran will not like it; if it is Lutheranism, the Roman Catholic will not be happy; if it is Romanism, the Jew will object; and so forth through all the religious faiths. On the other hand, if the belief in God and its consequences is not brought into correlation with the curriculum, then the believer is hurt. As a matter of fact, some of these private school parents believe that education from which religion has been eliminated is not simply education without religion, but is education based on the counter-religion of secularism which Will Herberg, professor of Judaic studies at Drew University, has accurately defined as "the theory and practice of human life conceived as self-sufficient and unrelated to God." [6] As a result, they have already done what President Van Dusen of Union Theological Seminary warned would happen: "Unless religious instruction can be included in the program of the public school, church leaders will be driven increasingly to the expedient of the church-sponsored school."

At this point I do not wish to argue for the validity of the reasons of many of the private school parents. I simply state as a fact that many parents of the Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Jewish faiths feel in their hearts that it is a matter of conscience before God that they send their children to a school that is compatible with their religious convictions. Whether they are right or wrong in their beliefs is not the point at issue now. For them it is a matter of conscience.

III. Non-Preferential School Aid

Our two main presuppositions so far have been (1) that the education of a child is the inalienable, God-given right and duty of the parent, and not of the state; and (2) that some parents, rightly or wrongly, feel that they are morally obligated to use the private schools.

If these two statements are true, then we believe that there must be a reappraisal of the present distribution of the school taxes. For regardless of whether or not the state agrees with the theological thinking of a Jew, Roman Catholic, or Protestant, as a democratic land that stresses freedom of religion, it must recognize that many people have deep religious convictions, and it may not coerce them against their conscience in these matters. Yet today under our present school tax structure all parents are taxed for the public schools, and then are required by law to send their children to school. If they have religious scruples against the public schools, they may send their children to the school of their own choice (Oregon case), but then they forfeit their school taxes and have to raise some more

6. Will Herberg, "Religion, Democracy and Public Education," in *Religion in America,* p. 130. He gives an enlightening discussion of this problem.

money for the religious education they choose. We do not believe that it is either Christian or just or American to require someone by law to violate his conscience, or if he chooses not to, to penalize him thousands of dollars (in the course of twelve years of education) by requiring him to provide for his own education in addition to the education he feels he cannot use. We believe that since it is the inalienable right of parents and not of the state to nurture their children, it is not just for the government to say, in effect: You must educate your child as we want or else you must pay thousands of dollars extra. Rather, each parent must have the right not only to send his child to the school of his choice, but also to pay only once for his education.

Sometimes the advocates of our present school tax system use the argument that if the parents desire a special education, they are entitled to it, but should pay for it.[7] Typical of this thought, for example, are the remarks of Professor George Williams of Harvard Divinity School at a seminar sponsored by the Fund for the Republic. He said: "It seems to me extremely important that the family's responsibility for the education of their children be preserved. But when this education is in the private school, parents must assume the responsibility of the payment of it lest there be an unnecessary proliferation of religious schools. Let's defend the right of the parents but the family must pay for this privilege." [8] For private schools to have their proportionate share of school taxes is pictured as a raid on public funds for private purposes. The schools are "free to all." If anyone does not like them, then he must pay for his own luxuries.

The fallacy of such argumentation is obvious. The private school adherents do not ask that someone else pay for the education of their children, so they will go free. They are already paying for their schools and in most cases gladly so. But what they do ask is that the state require the public school devotees to pay for the education of their own children, and not ask the 13 per cent of the population that favors private schools to pay for the public schools, too, in addition to their own educational system. They stand up for the right of parents to have a secularistic education, but then, they insist: "Let *them* pay for it. Do not discriminate against those who have religious convictions in school matters by causing them to share the public school burden. Let them shoulder their own burdens."

Furthermore, the slogan used that the public schools are "free to all" is open to question. Technically, the schools are open to all regardless of race, color, and creed. But in actuality, the problem is not so simple. If a person believes that it is against the will of God for him to send his child to the public school, then although the state technically offers him public

7. Paul Blanshard, "The Bus Wedge," in *Church and State,* April, 1957, p. 2.
8. *Religion and Freedom,* 1958, p. 20.

education, in reality he is not free to accept it. Most Americans cannot understand how a person could feel so strongly about the public schools. But the point at issue is not whether or not the majority thinks the minority is wrong, but whether the state is guaranteeing the basic freedom and rights of an individual by requiring him against his conscience to send a child to a school of a secularistic stamp or forfeit the school tax money which he paid for the education of his child.

In some cases, because of the limited wages received, certain parents do not even have the actual freedom to send their children to the religious school of their choice. It is too expensive.[9] They can pay for one education, but not for two. Thus their natural right to train their children as they desire is taken from them. In actuality the state coerces them to send their children to the public schools under pain of penalty.

To state the problem in another way: The parents of private school children are fulfilling their obligations of educating their children. If they did not do it, the state would have to do so. It is but natural and just that they not be required to pay a double school burden in the fulfillment of their religious convictions.

Leo Pfeffer, who is against the view we propose here, states the case very well in another situation. He wants to show that the governmental granting of tax exemption for church property is an explicable deviation in the principle of the separation of church and state. He writes: "But it must be remembered that this practice [tax exemption on church-owned property] long antedated the First Amendment and that it became established at a time when many of the social functions now considered part of a welfare state — care of the fatherless, the aged, the ill and infirm, the destitute — were performed almost exclusively by the churches. Since the churches performed these secular functions which would otherwise be performed by the state, it was both natural and just that they be relieved of the burden of paying monies which would be used to perform those very functions."[10] Although he is opposed to "distributive justice" in the case of school taxes, the very reason we would suggest in favor of it is admirably stated by his last sentence if the word *parents* is substituted for *churches*. The reason would then be that "since the parents performed these secular functions [in the case at hand, educating their children in schools of their choice] which would otherwise be performed by the state, it was both natural and just that they be relieved of the burden of paying monies which would be used to perform those very functions." This is precisely the point.

9. J. M. O'Neill, professor at Brooklyn College, estimates that in the year 1954-1955 it cost Roman Catholics $5,596,240 every school day to operate their schools (*Religion and Freedom,* p. 26).
10. Leo Pfeffer, "The Case for Separation," in *Religion in America,* p. 80.

As to the method of obviating this forced violation of conscience and inequity of a double school burden, there are at least three ways which have been used in history. One proven way which has been successfully used in the Netherlands for forty years is to distribute the school taxes proportionately to all schools of fifty pupils or more that meet state standards, regardless of race, color, or creed. This is essentially the same method that the United States uses in one instance. Wilbur Katz, professor of the University of Chicago Law School, points out: "Congress appropriates funds for education of the page boys who serve in the houses of Congress and the Supreme Court. For boys choosing to attend a parochial or private school, it is expressly provided that payment shall be made to the school chosen, but at a rate no greater than that provided for public schools of the District. Congress apparently takes the view that discrimination against pages attending parochial schools would unfairly restrain religious freedom. Nor did the draftsman even use the formula of payment to the student." [11]

Another way is to allow the taxpayer to indicate on his income tax form to which school he wishes his money to go, as is done in some provinces of Canada. This is the method that the New Jersey Synod of the Presbyterian Church in the USA recommended over a hundred years ago. In 1845 the Synod passed a resolution that all churches "may, with a fair prospect of success, apply for a Rule of the State, that every taxpayer, that every man, when he pays his tax for education, may signify to what denomination of Christians it shall be applied . . . If any should decline exercising their privilege, their money would be entirely at the disposal of the State." [12]

A third possibility for granting equity and obviating the forced violation of the conscience is to give the aid to the pupil and not to the school, as is the case with the G.I. Bill of Rights. Under this law, certain veterans may continue their education at the expense of the taxpayers at any recognized educational institution of the land. The legislators did not feel that it would be fair to insist that they all go to state universities, so they granted them the right to pick the school of their choice, whatever its religious nature might be. Thus, a veteran is not told that the state universities are available, and if he wants an education that conforms to

11. "The Case for Religious Liberty," in *Religion in America,* p. 111.
12. Anson Phelps Stokes, *Church and State in the United States* (New York, 1950), II, 676. Charles Hodge was one of the supporters of this proposal. Note also that the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the USA in 1847 went on record to the effect that "immediate and strenuous exertion should be made, as far as practicable, by every congregation to establish within its bounds one or more primary schools." As a result, 246 parochial schools were established (Stokes, *ibid.*). Incidentally, this same church has now overthrown her tradition by officially taking the diametrically opposite view in her statement *The Church and the Public Schools,* passed by the General Assembly of 1957.

his religious thinking this is an added luxury for which he must pay. Rather, a veteran may have the type of religiously oriented education he chooses, whether it be at a Lutheran high school or a Calvinistic seminary or a Jesuit college or an atheistic institution. All students are put on an equal financial basis and no discrimination is made because one is of a religious minority. No violation of the principle of separation of church and state is involved, as is evidenced by the fact that the constitutionality of this bill has never been challenged in the courts.

It matters little which one of these three methods is followed as long as there is the respect for the right of the parent to finance the education of his religious choice and not that of others.

IV. Objections

There are several objections that are often raised to this proposal. I mention only four. The first two are not weighty, but often used. The last two are the more important reasons usually set forth for the maintenance of the present school tax status.

1. Some argue that the practice of "distributive justice" would aid Rome greatly since she has so many parochial schools. Therefore they are against helping that church.

In reply to this it must be stated that the present distribution of school taxes is either just or not. We believe it is not, for the above-mentioned reasons. If that is so, then no one should use an unjust means to gain what they consider to be a just end. This is Jesuitry. Even if one thought Rome was the Anti-Christ, he should be careful not to fight the Anti-Christ, or the Devil, for that matter, with unjust means. The question revolves around the simple matter of justice. What is just for a Protestant is also just for a Roman Catholic; and what is unjust for a Protestant is also unjust for a Roman Catholic.

2. Several believe that "distributive justice" would cause a proliferation of schools so that there would be inefficiency in the running of them. In the seminar referred to, sponsored by the Fund for the Republic, Professor Leland Jamison of Princeton University exemplifies this approach: "There are 250 cults and sects in this country. I am disturbed about the consequences if every one of these 250 started setting up schools in this way. What kind of education chaos would there be if everybody sets up his own school system?" [13]

In answer to this, three facts should be kept in mind.

a) A minimum number of pupils in each school (for example, the Dutch fifty) and a certain number of years of existence would be necessary to qualify a school for aid.

13. *Religion and Freedom,* p. 24.

b) Although there would be an increase of schools, it is imaginative exaggeration to say that each denomination will have its own schools. For the majority of Americans are satisfied with the public school system. And in other countries where this system is used, history has shown the contrary.

c) Even if there is an increase in schools and costs — and there will be some — it is better to have that than to deny someone's basic freedom.

3. Perhaps the weightiest reason given in opposition to a plan of tax equity or "distributive justice" is that it would be against the First Amendment of our Constitution, which reads as follows: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, nor prohibiting the free exercise thereof." R. Freeman Butts poses the objection when he writes: "The conscientious citizen of any faith might well ask, 'If in practice we may allocate tax funds to sectarian schools without violating the principle of separation of church and state, what *does* the principle mean?'"[14] Is there not a "wall of separation of church and state" that would be breached if this aid were given? And once the camel's nose is under the tent, then come the humps and we have lost our liberty.

There are many pertinent observations that can be made on this type of reasoning. A long discussion could be entered upon as to the intent of the First Amendment. Did the authors intend that religion should not be taught in the schools at all? Edward S. Corwin, emeritus professor of jurisprudence at Princeton University, doubts it.[15] He cites the famous passage from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787: "Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." This ordinance, with the one of 1785, which set aside tracts of land for the support of education, formed the basis of the public school system in that territory northwest of the Ohio River. Corwin then asks: Did these same men who wrote these Ordinances make a fundamental change two years later when they adopted the First Amendment, and then switch back when they re-enacted the Northwest Ordinance in the same year? "Prima facie it seems doubtful. . . ."

Even if the intent of the authors of the First Amendment could be ascertained, there would remain the great debate whether the Constitution is to be viewed as static or dynamic. Leo Pfeffer, for example, holds that the Supreme Court is not bound by the specific intent of the authors, but that the Constitution needs to be reinterpreted in the light of the needs of contemporary generations.[16]

Another field of enquiry regarding the problem of the violation of the

14. *The American Tradition in Religion and Education* (Boston, 1950), p. 3.
15. "The Supreme Court as National Board," in *Law and Contemporary Problems* (Duke University School of Law), Winter, 1949, p. 3.
16. Pfeffer, pp. 52 ff.

First Amendment is this: Is the separation of church and state to be considered absolute? The opponents of this view remind us that the famous statement "wall of separation of church and state" is not in the Constitution, but was first written in a letter by President Jefferson, who explained to the Danbury Baptists why he could not proclaim a day of thanksgiving. They note that the father of the public schools, Horace Mann, never intended that there should be no religion at all in the public schools.[17] And they cite the innumerable examples of the intermingling of state and religion: chaplains in the armed forces and prisons; compulsory chapel attendance at West Point, Annapolis, and the Air Academy; payment of tuition of students at religious colleges under the G.I. Bill of Rights; permission for paying for text books[18] and bus rides[19] to parochial school children; school lunch programs for parochial and public schools; payment of parochial education of page boys in houses of Congress and the Supreme Court; grants to denominational hospitals; the motto "In God We Trust" placed on some of our currency; and tax exemption for church property.[20]

I make these observations, not so much as an argument for the thesis I am setting forth — for this demands much careful analysis — but as a word of caution that we cannot dismiss "distributive justice" with a hasty appeal to the First Amendment or Jefferson's phrase of the "wall of separation." It is much more complicated than that, as a perusal of the opinions of the Supreme Court justices (both pro and con) in the Everson bus case (1947) will indicate.

Clarity is to be gained in this matter of separation only if we keep in mind the cardinal point with which we began this article. When we remember that education is the domain of the home — and that the home has the exclusive right to give the religious direction of this education — then we see that non-preferential school aid does not violate the First Amendment. It simply honors the sovereignty of the home in education. If the state feels the necessity of entering in upon home matters, then it may do so under certain circumstances, but only if it remains sensitive to the sanctity of the home. For the state to take upon itself the matter of education, because of the default of some parents, and then to require every home to pay for this religious secularism[21] — even when the home is con-

17. Raymond B. Culver, *Horace Mann and Religion in Massachusetts Public Schools* (Yale, 1929).
18. Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 1930. This decision was upheld by the U. S. Supreme Court.
19. Everson v. Board of Education, 1947.
20. In the Winter 1949 issue of the quarterly published by the Duke University School of Law, which issue is devoted to the problem of "Religion and the State," five of the six authors whose articles deal with the problem of religion in the schools deny the possibility of rigid, absolute separation. Cf. Wilbur Katz (above, note 11) and Will Herberg (above, note 6).
21. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that public school education is not "neutral"

scientiously against it — is a flagrant violation of the domain of the home. If the state does enter the field of education to regulate the finances, then it must be jealous to do so with the utmost of equity, not discriminating because of religious convictions. For the state to be fair in financial matters is not a violation of the First Amendment, but simply a respect for the rights of the home. In fact, not to be fair may well be an infraction of the First Amendment, since it is a meddling by the state into the private religious affairs of the individual.[22]

4. Another major argument that is often used against non-preferential tax distribution is that it would upset the unity of the nation. Former President Conant of Harvard sets forth this line of reasoning in his *Education and Liberty.* He writes: "A dual system of schools with tax money going in some form to private schools, would be harmful to our democratic traditions. . . . The greater the proportion of our youth who attend independent schools, the greater the threat to our democratic unity. Therefore, to use taxpayers' money to assist such a move is, for me, to suggest that American society use its own hands to destroy itself."

A Protestant religious leader expresses it eloquently when he writes in a sermon: ". . . I believe in the public school system of America. It has been a great instrument for the equalization of our population. It made no division between creeds, classes or races. The public school has been the great melting pot of democracy. Into it have come the peoples of Europe of bi-lingual heritage and out of it have come citizens ready to assume responsibility in this great nation. It has been the means of the development of patriotism." [23]

In reply to this type of thinking, we must ask ourselves: Which is the

toward God, but is definitely "religious." Even though not a word is spoken against Christianity and the Christian God, merely to fail to relate the biblical principles to history, civics, and literature — to take but three examples — is to teach implicitly that we can truly understand these subjects without God. When God speaks so plainly in nature (Rom. 1: 18 ff.) and the Bible and thereby gives us guide lines for our everyday living, to be completely silent or "neutral" is a roaring denial that God and his biblical principles are relevant. Such ignoring runs counter to all the religious teaching that many children have received at home, and it constitutes not a "neutral" position, but a weighty pressure against their religious conscience. The question before us is not "neutral" versus religious education; but what kind of religious education: religious secularism or Lutheranism, Roman Catholicism, Calvinism, etc.

22. The organization Protestants and Other Americans United excels in its zeal for protecting the sovereign right of the state and churches so that they do not interfere with each other by overstepping the God-given boundaries of operation. Would that they might also excel in zeal for the protection of the rights of the home against the invasion of the state. It fights — and admirably so — every violation of the First Amendment. Would that it would fight with equal zealousness every violation of the sacredness of the conscience of parents.
23. H. J. Ockenga, *What Cardinal Spellman Wants for the American Schools,* a sermon preached at Park Street Church, Boston, Sept. 16, 1949.

higher concept, the sanctity of the melting pot or of the creational rights of the parents? To a certain extent the melting pot is a fine ideal. It does bring various faiths together and teaches them democracy in a practical way. But we do believe that if this violates a principle of justice, then justice must always triumph.

Mr. Conant's objections are not only against the giving of a fair share of school taxes to those who want to integrate their religion with education, but basically against the schools themselves. He cannot quite bring himself to say it, but the logic of his position would drive him to legislate out of existence this "threat to democratic unity," i.e., what he would term "divisive" parochial schools.

We question the assumption that it is good for America to standardize its education. Do we really want education to be in the hands of the state which will turn out an undifferentiated mass of secularized minds? Are we prepared to let the government mold the soul of our people for the sake of the unity of the secular democratic faith? Is not the difference between true democracy and the monolithic structure of totalitarianism that in a democracy there can be cultural diversity and religious pluralism in one political unit? Private schools are no more divisive than are churches. As churches have a right to exist without the government favoring one with taxes, so all schools should exist without any tax favors for one kind. Then the strength of democracy will be seen — not in the state-sponsored, monolithic, thought-forming schools — but in the diversity of cultures. At one time Americanization was a problem; today it is no longer the case because our country allows so little immigration. What we need today is not an emphasis on superimposed state unity, but on the richness of diversification.[24]

V. Conclusion

In conclusion it should be noted that these suggestions are not merely theoretical but have been proven workable in the history of many countries. They have been put to practice in one form or another in such countries as Switzerland, England, Holland, Belgium, and provinces of Canada. In these countries there has not been an undue proliferation of the schools, the government has not interfered with the schools any more than the United States has under the G.I. Bill of Rights, and there has been a respect of the basic educational right of every parent, giving no preferential aid to one over against another because of religion. In other words, there is "distributive justice."

24. For an excellent treatment of this thought see both Will Herberg's article in *Religion in America* and John Courtney Murray's article "Law or Prepossession?" in *Law and Contemporary Problems,* Winter, 1949.

THE DILEMMAS OF CHRISTIAN COLLEGES

BERNARD RAMM

In Christianity there is no institution which has a more noble intention and a more difficult task in achieving this intention than a Christian college. An educational institution with a curriculum centered around the revelation of God in sacred Scripture, administered and taught by a God-fearing faculty each member of which is a dedicated Christian, learned in his understanding of Christian theology, and highly competent in his professional area, is a golden dream. Would that we could achieve it! For what could be a greater blessing to the Christian Church than a network of Christian colleges each year graduating a great number of Christian young people who become the very salt of the Church in their adult years as they enter their professions and callings and in turn bless their local church with their college Christian training? And how much would the Christian ministry be enriched by a great number of ministers whose education in the Faith began in their freshman days when every course was not only taught with professional competence, but judiciously evaluated and criticized by a man who knew his theology as well as his own subject matter!

I am thoroughly in accord with the golden dream of a Christian college but I find its realization confronts every Christian college with certain very rugged dilemmas. The first of these dilemmas is the *dilemma of the constituency.* Unless a person has been on the inside of Christian college life he has no idea how "the mystically present constituency" governs almost every decision. The college is almost completely dependent upon its constituency for its life. From its constituency come its students, its contributions, and general good will. When a choir makes a good-will tour it is at the mercy of the good will of the constituency.

This relationship to the constituency is generally a good thing. It creates and maintains a living relationship between the Church and its educational institutions, and when this relationship is hampered or destroyed the Christian college becomes irresponsible with its treatment of the Christian faith. Along with the defection of our early colleges in America from the Christian faith went a breakdown of the "constituency-college" relationship. But the constituency also constitutes a problem.

Seldom may a Christian college do anything, say anything, or teach anything which offends a large part of the constituency. A college administration may feel that a certain matter is completely justified in and of itself; that the college can in honor act a certain way; that no compromise with the Christian faith is involved. But if such action offends a major section of the constituency nothing is done. The dollar bills of the con-

stituency form an invisible and very real fence, and a college administration may only effect policies *within* this fence.

Our evangelical constituency in America, for example, is more or less fundamentalistic, premillennial and dispensational. It is not monolithically so, but at least this group forms a large part of the constituency of many of our Christian schools. If in the quest of the truth of revelation, in a complete dedication to the supremacy of Scripture over all human theologies, a professor would seek to challenge some important part of this theological synthesis, he would find the administration checking him. For example, many of our schools profess to be *inter-* rather than *non-*denominational, and yet they are strongly dispensational. Now dispensationalism is part of no great Protestant creed, and therefore any school which professes to be *inter-*denominational and yet is strongly dispensational is doing something which is not cricket. But if a professor in a Christian college were to attempt a real critical appraisal of this situation he more than likely would be restrained by the "constituency."

In short, the almost complete reliance of the Christian college upon its constituency is a real limitation to its freedom to act, its freedom to experiment with certain items on the campus, and the academic freedom of its professors. And such a realistic limitation cannot but help create and foster an unhappy educational mediocrity.

The most difficult dilemma is *the dilemma of freedom-and-dilution, or restriction-and-mediocrity.* Christian schools do not go astray all at once on one big bender so to speak. It is a process extended over many decades and is the mass accumulative effect of many decisions. In America we are extremely self-conscious of this possibility of defection within a Christian school. We are highly suspicious of even the smallest items that appear to be straws indicating the coming mass exodus from the Christian faith. *The defection of Christian colleges from their faith is almost without exception* —given enough time. Some of our most impressive schools in America today that are *ganz und gar* secular were once upon a time centers of evangelical faith and piety. How do we stop this seemingly inevitable process? Here is where the dilemma faces us.

We may write out a strong creed, put it into the charter of the college in such a way that it can never be changed, and vigorously enforce it. We may jealously watch the doctrine of the board of trustees, the administration, and the faculty, and do the best that can be done to stamp this creed upon the mentality of every student in the school. Furthermore, whenever a defection of any degree is detected at any point in administration or faculty, it must be dealt with efficiently and immediately before it becomes a beachhead of heresy. New faculty members must be given a vigorous doctrinal quiz before accepting them.

Now such an efficient control over the college in all its departments will certainly make any inroads of heresy very difficult, and such a vigorous policy may well check the usual defection of the Christian college. But such a policy *will inevitably lead to academic mediocrity.* Theoretically it shouldn't, but actually it does. A Christian school which administers such a strong policy to retain its orthodoxy can only do so at the cost of its academic integrity. Great scholarship requires a certain amount of breathing space, of flexibility, of room to be creative. And a closely administered institution does not provide the proper intellectual atmosphere in which great scholarship must live. It is interesting to observe that Abraham Kuyper, famous for the Free University of Amsterdam — a school which comes as close to the ideal of the Christian school as any — recognized this. He states very clearly that the truly great scholar must be given all the rope he needs as he follows a pathway to its end to see if it is truth or error; and the Christian school must play out that rope! He also makes it clear that the scholar must be scrupulously honest and sever his connections with the Christian school if he finds his conclusions no longer in harmony with the Christian faith. But the rope must be played out if there is to be academic greatness. However, when a Christian college keeps its faculty on short tether mediocrity is the inevitable result.

But supposing the tether is made long, what then? There is little question that this would eventually produce a dilution of the faith of the college. Investigation creates more and more possibilities for the equivocation of the Christian faith, and its individual doctrines. Only an Augustine or an Aquinas or a Kuyper can take the full length of the tether and come out the better Christian. Academic freedom gyrates towards freedom from Christian faith. Schools which put the first premium on academic freedom and gave its faculty the long tether eventually secularized. *Such a pathway leads to the dilution of the faith.*

It is not that schools always set out fully conscious to be a short-tether or a long-tether school. Some schools certainly do; and it is remarkable how short some schools make the tether! Usually the dilution of the witness of a school is a practical matter. Every school which seeks some sort of accreditation must live in the academic world and under its pressures. A place on the history department is open. The administration looks for a man. To make the case extreme and pointed supposing they find Dr. John Jones with a good doctor's degree but with a rather confused understanding of Christian theology; and Mr. Sam Smith who is working on a master's degree at some school, who has limited possibilities, but is a real, genuine Christian. Academically Jones would be an asset to the school; spiritually he would be a risk. Smith will make a wonderful contribution to the spiritual life of the school, but he will not be a solid academic con-

tribution to the school. *Exactly at this point is the dilemma seen sharply.* Jones and academics or Smith and spirituality? Jones and competence or Smith and mediocrity?

If there is one Jones or two Joneses on the faculty they may be contained, or their influence negated by the over-all spiritual and theological vigor of the school. But when the population of Joneses increases the situation becomes difficult, for Jones wants only other Joneses to be hired! And so the process of dilution has begun.

Is there any realistic solution to either of these two dilemmas? A measure of financial independence helps relieve a Christian college of guiding its policies by the sole criterion of "what does the constituency think?" But perhaps this measure of financial independence is a most unrealistic solution! The only other possibility is a slow re-education of the constituency so that they may come to learn and appreciate what it means to be an *academic* institution, and not make unreasonable demands upon it, nor threaten it with the retention of their dollars. There are fewer things to this writer so wretchedly unchristian, and yet so marvelously efficient (and therefore employed), as bullying a Christian school into certain actions or policies by the bait of the dollar bill.

There is no real solution to the long-tether, short-tether dilemma. Christian colleges can do the best in resolving this dilemma if they are keenly aware of this dilemma; if they very systematically instruct their board of this dilemma; and if they are willing to wait years for a good faculty member, and willing to spend money to find him. Unwillingness to wait and failure to spend any sums in search of a faculty member are the bad policies which result in poor hiring.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

The Christian Teacher, by Perry D. LeFevre. New York: Abingdon Press, 1958. 176 pp. $2.75.

Existentialism and Education, by George F. Kneller. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. 170 pp. $3.75.

The Education of the Individual, by Alfred Adler. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. 143 pp. $3.50.

These three books have one thing in common — they deal with education; the first, from the viewpoint of the teacher, the other two having primary concern for the individual to be educated.

Perhaps they should be read in the order presented here, since Le Fevre's requires only a basic spiritual orientation whereas Kneller's clarifies some philosophical issues which are helpful to an understanding of Adler's,

and especially since Adler's style requires a good bit of co-operation from the reader.

Dr. Le Fevre is associate professor of theology and education in the Federated Theological Faculty of the University of Chicago. He is senior associate in the Danforth Foundation to which, along with other organizations which are "Pioneers in the renaissance of religion in American Higher Education," the book is dedicated.

This volume can be recommended for challenging the beginning Christian teacher and for removing the haze which sometimes blurs the vision of the teacher who has been in the profession for some time. Perhaps the most vital chapters concern themselves with "The Vocation of the Christian Teacher," the implications of method, and "The Christian Teacher as Counselor." For evangelicals the definition of "Christian" developed by the author will not be satisfactory nor the stand Le Fevre takes regarding the Bible when he says, "Changing concepts of revelation have brought an altered understanding of the role of the Bible in Christian faith." But no one will take exception to Le Fevre's clear delineation of the sense of call, service, and consecrated life of the Christian teacher.

The distinction between the function of the Christian teacher and that of any other teacher is not clear. In fact, the apologetic approach to this focal issue in the book can only be resolved by insistence upon the Scriptural revelation that he only is a Christ-one who has, by personal faith in the vicarious atonement, become a new creation indwelt by the very Spirit of God and committed to Him.

In man's search for certainty and the abundant life he has turned in recent years to a re-emphasis upon the significance of the individual and his development. Witness Riesman and others, *The Lonely Crowd;* Berrill, *Man's Emerging Mind;* Chalmers, *The Republic and the Person;* Whyte, *The Organization Man;* Overstreet, *The Mature Mind,* to mention only a few books centering upon this "new" emphasis.

Existentialism and Education continues in this tradition. Written by George Kneller of the University of California at Los Angeles, it seeks specifically to link the discovery of the individual to the existentialist position and to set forth the significance of existentialism for education.

This is an important book in two ways. (1) For the one who is uninitiated into the mysteries of existentialism this work is a nontechnical primer, summarizing the major contributions of Kierkegaard, Sartre, and others. In addition the "why" of existentialism is analyzed. (2) For the one who knows existentialism, this is likewise a significant book; for it develops the implications of the doctrine for education in areas such as "Religious and Moral Values," "Freedom and Authority," "The Individual and the Group," "The Teacher and the Student," "The Educational Process."

In the concluding chapter the strengths and weaknesses of existentialism are presented. The book is well documented with references to source materials. The appended bibliography is a valuable contribution to one who wishes to pursue the subject beyond the bounds of this volume.

This should be "must" reading for the Christian teachers and scholars who frequently oppose John Dewey, too often only because others have done so, and who may oppose existentialism, whether or not they understand it and recognize its implications for education.

In view of the typographical errors in the book, one questions whether the repetition of the final paragraph is intended to be artistic or emphatic, or whether it slipped in twice by error. At any rate, it is worth quoting as something of the keynote of the book:

> In the Socratic sense, you must begin to know by not knowing. If you know that you do not know, you may be born again. But you will be born again without the pain of birth. And you will have to do violence to your soul . . . to make it live.

Adler's concern, as well, is for the individual. The individual's relevance to others is significant. Each individual is unique and all men are equal. No action or relationship is ever lost because all is part of the "eternal moment."

Individuals are ends, not means. But not everyone comprehends this. We are baffled because one or more of the Four Horsemen oppose us: (1) confusion as to our place among others; (2) doubt about our equality with others; (3) "horror of the vacuities of the ephemeral"; and (4) doubt about the consequences of our actions.

To Adler "an individual may be called educated inasmuch as it is relatively easy to ascertain his relevance for 'relatively more' people." This may be achieved by love of one man for another. There will, too, be immortality as long as one person is aware of another's essence, "as there is love for it, it is immortal." Competition among individuals is a wholesome thing, for our function is to show others that they are better than they thought they were. But anyone may surpass anyone else at any time, since we live in a competitive universe. And this is normal as long as we look upon individuals as ends and not mere means. So runs the Adler message. It is enveloped in a style which, to say the least, is original but which requires the reader's entire co-operation at all times.

Although not sympathetic with the impact of historic Christianity, Adler and Kneller leave the reader a sadder and a wiser man — sadder because he realizes how he has often fallen short in recognizing the dignity of the immortal individual; wiser, because he has new insights and challenges in applying the Christian message to the educational process.

— *Peter Veltman*

Religion, Politics and the Higher Learning, by Morton White. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959. x, 144 pp. $3.50.

Some of our readers may know little about that modern school of philosophy known as analysis, and others who have made its acquaintance may see little practical import in its often obscure and highly technical pursuits. The former have small excuse, since not only is the school highly influential among philosophers and likely to remain so but it has been ably and readably presented in a variety of recent books. The latter may either have removed themselves from it bewildered by its apparent hair-splitting arguments or seen in it a danger to all things metaphysical and religious because of its avowed scientism. This fine collection of essays is intended for both groups of readers.

The Harvard professor begins by asking the philosopher to apply his highly-sharpened tools of language, method, and description to the cultural affairs and human concerns of our time. As elsewhere in this volume, White writes with perspicacity and polish, at once eloquently readable and reliable. But he writes sympathetically, not as a critic from without, but as a prophet from within. Analytic philosophy can and must aid in resolving the ideas and problems of our political, religious, legal, and educational arenas.

To reveal why analysis can be humanitarian, White gives us a series of essays on the history of recent British and American philosophy, with something of a bias toward those falling in the pragmatic and positivistic stream. Through these we see the critical viewpoint of analysis to metaphysical, ethical, and religious pursuits as well as the author's call for less undermining and more rebuilding. The views of two leaders in the movement, Ayer and Wittgenstein, are given in some detail — an aid to the neophyte who desires to learn.

Finally, White collects certain essays revealing what he believes to be exemplary beginnings for the project for which he calls. The first is a plea for an analytic philosophy of history, but it is incidentally a neat introduction to varied views on the meaning of history. The suggested conclusion is not as satisfactory. Linguistic philosophers are asked to clarify the logic of narration, a commendable task, but surely to ask what we mean isn't the same as to ask whether we are right in our views of historical meaning. The second essay in this section is a fine discourse on Isaiah Berlin's great book, *Historical Inevitability,* in which White analyzes Berlin's views on the moral implications of determinism in human events.

For his closing discourse, the author pursues a defense for the thesis that man should be religious. Once again he uses the typical analytic switch from "Are you correct in believing in God?" to "What do you mean when you say you believe?" I will leave the reader to discover how well the defense of religious feeling is carried out. The final essay on the social

philosophies of Niebuhr and Lippmann is an elaboration of this theme and most interesting. Tucked away among all this are White's views on the place of religious instruction in higher education. Critics of Christian colleges should learn much from these pages.

This is a tasty meal in the reading but it is strangely lacking in nutrition on digesting. If one starts with White's analytic menu he will gain only its deserts. The reviewer remains convinced that analysis is critically important as a *tool* in even Christian philosophy but it fails as a *foundation* in any philosophy. —*Thomas H. Leith*

Between the Testaments, by Charles F. Pfeiffer. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1959. 132 pp. $2.95.

To the thoughtful observer the four-century period between the close of the Old Testament and the beginning of the New can only be one of the greatest significance. It is to this period that he must look to find the answers to several striking differences which meet him in the New Testament, where Rome, not Persia, is the sovereign of the world, where parties and sects unknown to the Old Testament are familiar expressions of Jewish piety, where the widespread diffusion of the Jews and the success of the proselyte movement are often disturbing features in the Roman world, and where Greek, not Aramaic, is the international language. The discovery of an Essene center in the wilderness of Khirbet Qumran, and of the biblical, sectarian and apocalyptic scrolls which the sect treasured and copied, raises the important question of the fate of biblical religion during these centuries, where one finds priestly apocalypticism, scribal legalism, Hellenistic Judaism and secularism existing side by side with the devotion of a Simeon or an Anna who were patiently waiting for "the consolation of Israel." It is to these issues and questions that Professor Charles Pfeiffer has devoted a brief volume, in which his purpose has been to outline the broader background which is necessary for evaluating the changes in religious tone and climate at the time of the advent of the Savior.

The intertestamental period has been conveniently divided into two periods, the Persian and the Hellenistic (which includes the early Roman period). Almost half of the text is devoted to the Persian period and to the sovereigns which dominate it, and here Pfeiffer is at his best. The history and vicissitudes of the Near East are sketched with deft strokes, with the result that the cultural and international climate which constitutes the backdrop for Judah's struggle to rebuild itself and to achieve some measure of autonomy emerges clearly. The treatment of the Hellenistic and early Roman period is less satisfying only because it is far more complex and lends itself less to succinct summary statement. A more vivid image of Alexander, the measure of Hellenism, or of Pompey, the soldier-administrator who under mandate from the Roman Senate cleared the

Mediterranean of piracy within a three-month period, would do much to convey the strengths and the difference in the Greek and Roman temperament. The rivalry between the Oniad and the Tobiad houses is a very complex and important point of concern in Jewish religious history, involving shifting alliances with the Ptolemies and the Seleucids, the diaspora communities of Alexandrian and Babylonian Jewry, Temple support and commercial expansion in Judea; and it resists brief treatment. Yet for the pastor or Bible student who desires an introduction to the materials, movements and personalities which dominate the intertestamental period it is precisely a brief treatment, accomplished with broad strokes, which is often most helpful.

The strength of the volume as a text lies in the fact that the major themes are treated in brief sections which can be freely expanded by a teacher, the significance of general statements can be underlined, and at numerous points details which would be of genuine interest have necessarily been omitted. Occasionally statements are made which fail to suggest the critical problems which attend an issue, such as the easy identification of Gobryas and Darius the Mede (p. 17, against which see D. J. Wiseman, "The Last Days of Babylon," *Christianity Today,* II:4 [Nov. 25, 1957], pp. 7-10), or the assurance that elephantine worship was polytheistic (pp. 55f., against which see W. F. Albright, *Archeology and the Religion of Israel* [1942], pp. 168-174), and these offer excellent points of departure for supplementation and class discussion. The text is supplemented with a helpful chronological table of the period, a bibliography on primary sources available for further study, a suggested reading list and a general index. — *William L. Lane*

Literature and Belief, edited by M. H. Abrams. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. 184 pages. $3.75.

This little book is an effort to bring up to date the thirty-five-year-old discussion of whether literary art should be "pure," that is, dissociated from actual life, or whether it is unavoidably and forever attached to man as philosophic and moral creature. Four of the six essays (those by M. H. Abrams, Douglas Bush, Cleanth Brooks, and Walter J. Ong, S.J.) were produced for the meeting of the English Institute in 1957. The last two (by Nathan A. Scott, Jr. and Louis L. Martz) were written for other conferences. Together the six essays provide a unified, if at times somewhat pedantic, discussion of the problem.

With his usual acumen, Douglas Bush points out that because man is made in the image of God there is a residue of genuine value in his greatest literary works whether they be pagan or Christian. He thinks that works tied to ephemeral themes, such as some of the plays of Ibsen and Shaw, will fade with the fading of causes which they champion. It will be in-

teresting to Milton scholars to notice Professor Bush's assertion that those who find Satan the hero of *Paradise Lost* may do so through a dislike of Milton himself rather than through an interpretation of the poem.

I have the feeling that the first part of Cleanth Brooks's essay is largely argument simply for the sake of argument. In the latter part, however, he faces real issues and speaks with considerable acuteness about them. His position is perhaps best recapitulated by citing his remark on Romeo and Juliet. They are not, says he, "doctrinaire exponents of a special moral code, nor on the other hand candidates for some psychiatrist's casebook. Their motivations are mixed and are intimately related to the mixed world of good and evil in which they have their being."

The best of the essays for me is that by Nathan A. Scott, who ventures to raise the question whether anything has been achieved by the voluminous modern discussion of poetic art and belief. He takes decided exception to those who hold that a poem is simply a verbal structure whose analysis involves chiefly a study of grammar and syntax. Although Scott approves Paul Tillich's remark that "no cultural creation can hide its religious ground," he believes that in recent times it has become increasingly difficult to practice T. S. Eliot's principle that judging a work of art by artistic standards and by religious standards ought to come in the end to the same thing. —*Clyde S. Kilby*

Milton and This Pendant World, by George Wesley Whiting. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958. xviii and 264 pp. Illustrated. $5.00.

In the published works to date of George Wesley Whiting on Milton one may see the author's preëminent concern with the history of ideas as an approach to the interpretation of the great British poet. His conviction is stated clearly in the Prologue to this present publication:

> By no means disparaging the closest scrutiny of poetic form and meaning, I urge that only a patient and thorough investigation of tradition and the historical setting will enable the student to understand fully what Milton means. . . . A true understanding of Milton's poetry depends upon the comprehension of his thought and its relation to an extensive and complex background, literary, intellectual, and spiritual [vii].

Thus the bulk of *Milton and This Pendant World* is devoted to an examination of the literary, intellectual, and spiritual milieu of Milton.

Properly conspicuous in Whiting's study of Milton's background are patristic, medieval, and Reformation (especially Puritan) writings relevant to Milton's major poems *Comus, Lycidas, Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained,* and *Samson Agonistes.* Readers will be interested to note that the Commentary of the Geneva Bible, which was first published in 1560 and was pronouncedly Protestant in its sentiments, is presented by Whiting more frequently than any other single work as a statement of the climate of religious opinion with which Milton was identified. For though Milton may be called a Christian humanist, he is withal decidedly Protestant.

It is an evidence of the character of our century that such a book needed to be written. Milton's readers a century or two ago would not have found his classical and Biblical allusions and his spiritual tone obscure or quaint. It is to a generation thus "increasingly skeptical, in a culture dominated by the assumptions of the natural and historical sciences and by the illusions of progress and enlightenment" (xiii) that Whiting addresses himself. "This pendant world," a phrase from *Paradise Lost,* becomes the key symbol of the priority of the vertical relationship between man's soul and God which characterized Milton and his mileu. And Professor Whiting soundly and trenchantly sets forth the main outlines of this religious mode of thought, quoting copiously from primary sources.

Such a controlling purpose calls for clear convictions. Whiting does not hesitate to say of a contemporary critic of *Comus:* "His disapproval of the idea of virtue or of chastity as a principle of moral conduct and righteousness is, I think, the real but unacknowledged basis of his strictures on *Comus* as a work of art" (27). Introducing a topic related to *Paradise Lost,* he says:

> Some critics are apparently insensitive to the spiritual truth of Milton's poetry. They are obviously not enchanted by his vision "Of things invisible to mortal sight." Undoubtedly some of these critics are skillful, ingenious, learned, and sophisticated; but it is clear that preoccupied as they are with aesthetic considerations they tend to ignore the vital subject: that to Milton the life of the spirit was the most important, the veritable reality [59].

Or again: "Appreciation of religious poetry is not a matter of mere aesthetics, of responding to sonorous cadences and vivid or sublime images. True appreciation demands thoughtful consideration of religious doctrine and spiritual values" (122). In this connection, the evangelical reader will appreciate a prefatory remark Professor Whiting makes concerning personal indebtedness to others: "But, after all has been said, my greatest debt, which can never be paid, is to my mother, who revering the Word of God strove daily to be true to her Christian faith . . ." (xii).

So mindful is the author of the difference between Milton's day and ours that he devotes an entire chapter to the subject "*Paradise Lost,* Protestantism, and the Retreat from Christianity" (pp. 129-168). In this section he relies heavily upon Charles E. Raven's *Natural Religion and Christian Theology* (The Gifford Lectures 1951) and J. V. Langmead Casserley's *The Retreat from Christianity in the Modern World* (London, 1952). In some respects this is the most vital chapter of Whiting's entire work; it certainly displays the fact that this Emeritus Professor of English at Rice Institute is conversant with the twentieth century at its weakest pulse.

Inasmuch as to be human is to err, we may expect that this work will not satisfy all readers in its entirety. I myself think that Professor Whiting's strong convictions sometimes lead him to be overly assertive, unnecessarily

prolix, and sometimes unfair. I am not sure that I care to see Professor C. S. Lewis labeled "the cultured fundamentalist" (164) or Professor W. R. Parker, under whom I studied with admiration, called "our eminent iconoclast" (204). But I am willing to rest in the observation that where there is strong feeling, there is apt to be strong speaking; I respect, also, the profound strength of Professor Whiting's integrity. —*Ralph Hone*

BRIEF NOTICES

The Development of Personality: the Old and the New, by Arthur C. Custance. Ottawa: Doorway Papers, 1958. 54 pp. $1.00.

This small booklet, listed as no. 14 in the series of Doorway Papers, is an attempt to correlate personality studies with the research data from the fields of psychology, genetics, anthropology, and theology. The introduction admits a lack of depth in treatment of the theme and rightly so. Though there are interesting suggestions presented for study and an attempt is made to evaluate the above mentioned disciplines with the biblical view of man, one is left with the feeling that the door has not yet been opened. —*D.F.T.*

God and Freud, by Leonard Gross. New York: David McKay Co., 1959. 215 pp. $3.95.

Mr. Gross, a newspaperman, has presented in reportorial detail the amazing rapprochement of psychoanalytic theories and theological functions. Such a 'coming together' is well and widely known in both psychological and theological circles and this popular account will no doubt spread the news to laymen who have not heard. The book is well written and concludes with a very important message for those who are prepared to publish the banns of the persons listed in the title—"I might say that you're playing with fire." —*D.F.T.*

Calvary Attitudes, by R. B. Jones. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1958 80 pp. $1.50.

The Crucial Words from Calvary, by H. H. Hobbs. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1958. 103 pp. $1.95.

Loyalty to Christ, by D. E. Demaray. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1958. 105 pp. $1.50.

Here are three volumes on the perennially vital subject of Calvary. Demaray's sermons on the theme of "Loyalty to Christ" are less directly concerned with Easter as they view the tests and victories of various men and their loyalty to Christ. Hobbs writes on the familiar seven sayings from the Cross. It is a scholarly meditation on the well known words whose significance is never exhausted. "Calvary Attitudes" is concerned with the people involved in the crucifixion and their attitudes toward Christ. Any one or all three of these books will provide spiritual food for the reader at Easter or any other time of year. —*P.C.J.*

An Exposition of the Whole Bible, by G. Campbell Morgan. Westwood, N.J.: Fleming H. Revell, 1959. 542 pp. $6.95.

A new volume by G. Campbell Morgan is a most unusual event. The chapters of this book were originally printed separately in a small British magazine, but until now were never collected in book form. The purpose is to furnish a brief summary of the content and meaning of each chapter. The perspective given the purpose and movement of the Bible by this method is never achieved in the usual commentary; yet it is most vital for a proper understanding of the Word of God. The reader, whether scholar, clergyman, or Christian young or old will find this a different and most excellent help in his study. —*P.C.J.*

An Architect Preaches, by H. Harold Kent. London: Independent Press, [1957]. 205 pp.

If these sermons are typical of their author, the people of Emmanuel Church in Toronto are fortunate indeed. Avoiding theological or exegetical hair-splitting, they nevertheless reflect a soundness of scholarship, and a winsome way of introducing the fruits of scholarship in the pulpit, which are refreshing. But their most outstanding trait is a never-failing concern for the practical needs of Christian living, an emphasis reinforced by the vigorous style which makes these sermons so enjoyable to read.

—*C.A.H.*

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT ARTICLES

THOMAS H. LEITH

American Association of University Professors Bulletin. All interested in Christian colleges should read this journal faithfully so that they may compare the standards and practices of these with those of the rest of the academic community. Start with the Summer issue.

American Scholar, Winter 1958-59. Discusses the dangers of nonconformism. The Spring issue has an article on science in the liberal arts.

Andover Newton Bulletin for June has a series on Jung and analytic psychology completed.

Antioch Review has a Spring issue on the Darwin centenary. Of special interest are articles on philosophy and Christianity and Darwinism.

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. The January issue was on contemporary China, the March issue on preventing juvenile delinquency, and the September issue is on American civilization and its leadership needs, 1960-1990.

Asbury Seminarian, Spring-Summer. Articles on Tillich's anthropology and doctrine of God.

Association of American Colleges Bulletin. The March issue is on the pursuit of excellence.

Atlantic in June has A. W. Griswold, "The Fine Arts and the Universities."

Australasian Journal of Philosophy for May discusses anthropology after Freud in a fine article.

Bibliotheca Sacra for January has K. S. Kantzer on Neo-orthodoxy and the inspiration of Scripture and the April and July numbers contain a series on water baptism in the ancient church.

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. February's issue contains an article on teleology and science. See also the lengthy discussion in the letters of the March 6 issue of *Science.*

Centennial Review, Winter. John Kirk, "Science and Faith." C. J. Ducasse writes "What Has Science Done for Religion?" and there are articles on Russia and American education and on scientific creativity in the Spring number. "Science and Gnosis in Jung's Psychology" is an article in the Summer issue.

Commentary, September. An article on Paul and Jewish theology.

Canadian Journal of Theology, July. Articles on religious aspects of Marxism and on perfectionism in theology and psychology.

Catholic Biblical Quarterly. April. Discusses some modern protestant attitudes toward hermeneutics.

Christian Century, April 1. Discussion of Protestantism's failures in higher education. The May 20 and June 6 and 17 discuss science, the Bible, and theology. E. J. Carnell writes "Post-Fundamentalist Faith" on August 28.

Christian Scholar for June has articles on value judgments in higher education.

Christianity Today. May 11 has R. E. D. Clark's article on evolution or creation, with letters of reply on July 6. The June 22 articles on Christianity and the American Revolution and Christianity and the United Nations are fine as is the article on tax exemption and the churches on August 3.

Church History for June has J. McNeill on "The Significance of the Word of God for Calvin."

Concordia Theological Monthly discusses faith healing in April.

Current History for September is an issue on government and labor in the U.S. — past and present.

Daedalus last Winter issue was devoted to education in an age of science. Bestor, Hook, Mead, Nagel, Riesman, and Niebuhr show the standard of this discussion. In the Summer issue there are fine articles on population control from Catholic and Protestant viewpoints and on the status and politics of American intellectuals.

Diogenes, Winter. Marcel Brion, "Abstract Art: Its Origin, Nature, and Significance." The ambiguities of the sciences of man are analyzed in the Summer number.

Discovery in January has articles on science and politics.

Dublin Review, Spring. A. R. Ubbelohde, "The Unity of Science."

Ecumenical Review, July. An article on Catholicism and religious liberty.

Etc, Winter. A. Rapoport, "General Semantics and Thomism: Their Contrasting Metaphysical Assumptions."

Ethics, April. H. J. McCloskey, "The State and Evil."

Evolution, September. M. H. Briggs, "Dating the Origin of Life on Earth."

Expository Times in April, May, June, and August; *Foundations* for July, and *Interpretation* for April contain articles on apostolic succession.

Faith and Thought for Autumn 1958 has articles on Qumran and the New Testament and on brain and will. The gift of tongues and the evidence of religious beliefs in paleolithic man are also discussed. The Winter issue discussed Freud, ancient Semitic ideas of afterlife, and the concepts of chance and progress in evolution.

Free University Quarterly for February has an article on man as religious being and modern psychology. In May Shakespeare's spiritual evolution and Greek and Christian ideas of nature are studied.

Harvard Theological Review for January and April has two interesting articles on the theology of Milton and Coleridge.

Hibbert Journal in January discusses the origins of Christian Science and in April discusses God and chance.

His in February has articles on science and the Bible and on language and Biblical inerrancy. In April the obligations of Christian students and professors are studied and in June science and Scripture and methods for Christian teachers are discussed.

Humanist, January. P. Frank, "The Present Role of Science."

Inquiry for Spring has articles on chance in social affairs and on the genetic fallacy and naturalistic ethics. J. Meynand writes "Methodological Uncertainties in Political Science" in the Summer number.

Interpretation for January discusses Catholics and the Bible and for July discusses Protestants and the Bible.

Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation last December had Douglas Young writing on Genesis 1: 1 and in March had articles on radiocarbon dating, revising the calendar, and leprosy in ancient Hebraic times.

Journal of Bible and Religion for January is a symposium on demythologizing.

Journal of Biblical Literature for June discusses the application of mathematical probability to manuscript discoveries.

Journal of Higher Education for April is a symposium on religion and the state university.

Journal of Philosophy on July 2 had an article on Tillich, existentialism, and psychoanalysis.

Journal of Religion for January is a full issue on the church and American business and for April has an article on philosophical analysis and philosophy of religion.

Journal of Religious Thought for Autumn-Winter 1958 asks "Is a Christian Grounding of Democracy Necessary?"

Journal of Southern History for February has an article on the Protestant Episcopal Church: An American adaptation.

London Quarterly and Holborn Review, January. Article on doctrines of creation and the rise of science. July has articles by De Wolf on natural theology and by C. A. Coulson on some recent scientific developments and their theological import.

Mind, July. An exploration of the analogies of birth, suicide, and the doctrine of creation.

New Testament Studies for January has H. P. Owen, "The Scope of Natural Revelation in Romans 1 and Acts 17."

Philosophy of Science for January has an article on the evolution of human nature and for April a study of the problems of basing ethics on the scientific method.

Practical Anthropology, January-February, is a symposium on the goals of Christian education among non-Christian peoples. In May-June every article is stimulating; they deal largely with cultural anthropology and Christian mores.

Reformed Journal for March has P. Borst, "Working Patterns in the Social-Economic Field."

Religion in Life for Spring had articles on the evangelism of Billy Graham and on Tillich's and Freud's view of sin.

Review and Expositor for April contains a consideration of the place of religion in public education and the entire July issue is on the church and race relations.

Science of January 30 asks to what extent the social sciences can help solve the problem of man, of July 10 discusses the differing nature of colleges and their ability to develop talent, of July 31 has Miller and Urey writing on the origins of life on the primitive earth, and of August 28 has "Explanation and Prediction in Evolutionary Theory" by M. Scriven.

Science Counselor discusses fossil man and evolution in June.

Scientific American for March discusses evolution in action in a fine article. The May number has articles on the origin of Darwinism and on the impact of Christendom on Melanesian society.

Scottish Journal of Theology for March has John MacIntyre on "Analogy."

Theological Studies for March analyzes the moral problem of war.

Theology Today has D. C. McClelland, "Religious Overtones in Psychoanalysis."

Thomist in January has a review article on Margenau's lecture, "Thomas and the Physics of 1958: A Confrontation." Structural and operational approaches to the physical world are evaluated in July's issue.

University of Toronto Quarterly for October, 1958 is an entire issue on the humanities in Soviet education. Sir G. Vickers writes, "The Unstable Society" and there is an extensive analysis of Canadian writing in 1958 in the July copy.

Westminster Theological Journal for last November has Stanford Reid on "Christianity and Scholarship" and an analysis of the philosophies of history of Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr is continued. In May E. J. Young writes on Gen. 1: 1-3 and C. Van Til writes on the Christian Scholar.